PersonalEscrito and 1 other boosted
Rita, antifascist 🏴🦯🦯🦯
@OldSquida2@kolektiva.social  ·  activity timestamp 2 days ago
Rita, antifascist 🏴🦯🦯🦯
@OldSquida2@kolektiva.social  ·  activity timestamp 2 days ago
Pablo Majster :clippy:
@ppaluchowski64@infosec.exchange  ·  activity timestamp 3 days ago
Fight Chat Control
@chatcontrol@mastodon.social  ·  activity timestamp 3 days ago
What happened today? Behind closed doors, the Law Enforcement Working Party group approved the revised Danish Chat Control compromise with broad support. While mandatory scanning had officially been dropped, Article 4 of the new text reframes and reintroduces it by obliging providers of e-mail, chat, and messenger services to take “all appropriate risk mitigation measures”. This effectively forces providers to scan all messages, including private, end-to-end encrypted content. The same article outlaws anonymous communication by requiring every citizen to verify their age before accessing a service, kneecapping whistleblowers, journalists, political activists, and people seeking help who depend on anonymity. Article 6 further imposes a digital house arrest and would ban minors from installing software which comes with a significant risk of grooming, such as WhatsApp, Instagram, and online games like Roblox. What happens next? The legislation now moves to the Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representations) for approval. Without major political objections, the Council will formally adopt its position. At this stage, both the Council and Commission unite in imposing mass surveillance on all 450 million citizens of the European Union and we enter a rushed trilogue. Unfortunately, while the mandate of the European Parliament does not suffer from the same flaws, the Parliament is traditionally known for giving in. What now? We raise our voices. Louder.
What happened today? Behind closed doors, the Law Enforcement Working Party group approved the revised Danish Chat Control compromise with broad support. While mandatory scanning had officially been dropped, Article 4 of the new text reframes and reintroduces it by obliging providers of e-mail, chat, and messenger services to take “all appropriate risk mitigation measures”. This effectively forces providers to scan all messages, including private, end-to-end encrypted content. The same article outlaws anonymous communication by requiring every citizen to verify their age before accessing a service, kneecapping whistleblowers, journalists, political activists, and people seeking help who depend on anonymity. Article 6 further imposes a digital house arrest and would ban minors from installing software which comes with a significant risk of grooming, such as WhatsApp, Instagram, and online games like Roblox. What happens next? The legislation now moves to the Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representations) for approval. Without major political objections, the Council will formally adopt its position. At this stage, both the Council and Commission unite in imposing mass surveillance on all 450 million citizens of the European Union and we enter a rushed trilogue. Unfortunately, while the mandate of the European Parliament does not suffer from the same flaws, the Parliament is traditionally known for giving in. What now? We raise our voices. Louder.
What happened today? Behind closed doors, the Law Enforcement Working Party group approved the revised Danish Chat Control compromise with broad support. While mandatory scanning had officially been dropped, Article 4 of the new text reframes and reintroduces it by obliging providers of e-mail, chat, and messenger services to take “all appropriate risk mitigation measures”. This effectively forces providers to scan all messages, including private, end-to-end encrypted content. The same article outlaws anonymous communication by requiring every citizen to verify their age before accessing a service, kneecapping whistleblowers, journalists, political activists, and people seeking help who depend on anonymity. Article 6 further imposes a digital house arrest and would ban minors from installing software which comes with a significant risk of grooming, such as WhatsApp, Instagram, and online games like Roblox. What happens next? The legislation now moves to the Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representations) for approval. Without major political objections, the Council will formally adopt its position. At this stage, both the Council and Commission unite in imposing mass surveillance on all 450 million citizens of the European Union and we enter a rushed trilogue. Unfortunately, while the mandate of the European Parliament does not suffer from the same flaws, the Parliament is traditionally known for giving in. What now? We raise our voices. Louder.
Pablo Majster :clippy:
@ppaluchowski64@infosec.exchange  ·  activity timestamp 3 days ago
European Commission
@EUCommission@ec.social-network.europa.eu  ·  activity timestamp last month
Piratenpartij
@Piratenpartij@mastodon.social  ·  activity timestamp last month
Molly boosted
Ruben De Smet
@rubdos@mastodon.social  ·  activity timestamp 3 months ago
Ruben De Smet
@rubdos@mastodon.social  ·  activity timestamp 3 months ago
MissConstrue
@MissConstrue@mefi.social  ·  activity timestamp 3 months ago
MissConstrue
@MissConstrue@mefi.social  ·  activity timestamp 3 months ago
Tommaso Gagliardoni
@tomgag@infosec.exchange  ·  activity timestamp 4 months ago
An excerpt from Patrick Breyer's website, stating: The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence The EU Commission proposes to oblige providers to search all private chats, messages, and emails automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The stated aim: To prosecute child sexual exploitation material (CSEM). The result: Mass surveillance by means of fully automated real-time surveillance of messaging and chats and the end of privacy of digital correspondence. Other aspects of the proposal include ineffective network blocking, screening of personal cloud storage including private photos, mandatory age verification resulting in the end of anonymous communication, appstore censorship and excluding minors from the digital world.
An excerpt from Patrick Breyer's website, stating: The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence The EU Commission proposes to oblige providers to search all private chats, messages, and emails automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The stated aim: To prosecute child sexual exploitation material (CSEM). The result: Mass surveillance by means of fully automated real-time surveillance of messaging and chats and the end of privacy of digital correspondence. Other aspects of the proposal include ineffective network blocking, screening of personal cloud storage including private photos, mandatory age verification resulting in the end of anonymous communication, appstore censorship and excluding minors from the digital world.
An excerpt from Patrick Breyer's website, stating: The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence The EU Commission proposes to oblige providers to search all private chats, messages, and emails automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The stated aim: To prosecute child sexual exploitation material (CSEM). The result: Mass surveillance by means of fully automated real-time surveillance of messaging and chats and the end of privacy of digital correspondence. Other aspects of the proposal include ineffective network blocking, screening of personal cloud storage including private photos, mandatory age verification resulting in the end of anonymous communication, appstore censorship and excluding minors from the digital world.
Tommaso Gagliardoni
@tomgag@infosec.exchange  ·  activity timestamp 4 months ago
An excerpt from Patrick Breyer's website, stating: The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence The EU Commission proposes to oblige providers to search all private chats, messages, and emails automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The stated aim: To prosecute child sexual exploitation material (CSEM). The result: Mass surveillance by means of fully automated real-time surveillance of messaging and chats and the end of privacy of digital correspondence. Other aspects of the proposal include ineffective network blocking, screening of personal cloud storage including private photos, mandatory age verification resulting in the end of anonymous communication, appstore censorship and excluding minors from the digital world.
An excerpt from Patrick Breyer's website, stating: The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence The EU Commission proposes to oblige providers to search all private chats, messages, and emails automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The stated aim: To prosecute child sexual exploitation material (CSEM). The result: Mass surveillance by means of fully automated real-time surveillance of messaging and chats and the end of privacy of digital correspondence. Other aspects of the proposal include ineffective network blocking, screening of personal cloud storage including private photos, mandatory age verification resulting in the end of anonymous communication, appstore censorship and excluding minors from the digital world.
An excerpt from Patrick Breyer's website, stating: The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence The EU Commission proposes to oblige providers to search all private chats, messages, and emails automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The stated aim: To prosecute child sexual exploitation material (CSEM). The result: Mass surveillance by means of fully automated real-time surveillance of messaging and chats and the end of privacy of digital correspondence. Other aspects of the proposal include ineffective network blocking, screening of personal cloud storage including private photos, mandatory age verification resulting in the end of anonymous communication, appstore censorship and excluding minors from the digital world.
⁉️
@chiefbongo@mastodon.social  ·  activity timestamp 4 months ago
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