Just read this line in @heathercoxrichardson.substack.com latest newsletter (27.01.26):
"FBI director Kash Patel yesterday told a right-wing podcaster that the FBI will be investigating the Signal chats of those organized in Minneapolis to observe and record federal agents to see if they have endangered federal agents."
I thought Signal was a safe-ish way to communicate. Can the feds get your chats anytime they want? Someone please explain.
@saltywizard @heathercoxrichardson.substack.com
Hi,
Signal is considered secure. But the end to end encryption is really only as good as the end user devices. If we have a Signal chat, and the FBI comes and asks for my phone and I hand it over. The best encryption in the world can't help.
I suspect if they are investigating the chats, its because they physically have devices of some involved in the chats.
Which is why self destructing messages can be important.
- Sudo
@ImpracticalPrivacy @saltywizard @heathercoxrichardson.substack.com
I would also like to add that GrapheneOS has a duress mode. You create a unique "unlock" code that triggers the duress mode to wipe the contents of your phone. Only the GrapheneOS remains.
I run GrapheneOS on a refurbished, carrier unlocked Pixel 6 Pro, which I acquired for about $235.
@TheLastOfHisName @saltywizard @heathercoxrichardson
Oh 100%. I use GrapheneOS as my daily on my Pixel. Pair the duress pin with using 2 factor sign in (fingerprint+pin) and it's a decent. I also highly recommend checking your USB port settings and make sure they make sense for your threat model.
But there is some legal gray area around intentionally destroying evidence if your device is already in custody. Not saying using the duress isn't the right call, but it also has its own risk set.
