Screengrab from a thesis. Key parts: Da Silva Neves, Bonnefon, and Raufaste (2002) write, of a set of properties they hypothesised that reasoners’ inferences ought to satisfy: "...even if we expect human inference to corroborate these properties, we know of no sufficient reason to think that lay reasoners would recognize any ratio- nality postulate as valid, neither that they would conscientiously use them to guide their reasoning. [...] we assume that human inference is constrained by knowledge organisation in memory and that its formal properties emerge from a spreading activation process operating directly on knowledge structures. Politzer et al. (2006, Footnote 2) write that they "do not test and are not committed to the notion that people have internal representations in the form of Gergonne (1817) diagrams." Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008, p. 39) write: "Of course we agree that subjects don’t “know these logics” just in the sense that they don’t know the grammar of English, but they do know these logics just in the sense that they do know the grammar of English.”