A reasonably practical guide to validating RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures for ActivityPub in PHP

If you're reading this, you've probably been hitting your head against a brick wall trying to parse and decipher the new HTTP Signatures sent by Mastodon and other Fediverse servers.

This is a basic and somewhat incomplete guide to accepting these signatures. I'm sure there are various gotchas, but it works with the signatures I've seen in the wild.

Shut Up And Show Me The Code!

OK, wow, no need to be a dick about it! Here's how I validated a real signature that my server received.

 PHP$verified = openssl_verify(
data: '"@method": POST"@target-uri": https://example.viii.fi/inbox"content-digest": sha-256=:tFdB/ENGczHMlZMDb66pXoUi2d0OqH2iBHdnN/WV1mc=:
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest");created=1787780262;keyid="https://mastodon.social/users/Edent#main-key"',
signature: base64_decode( "sIfmNsM/Q8iG6AJlne1IkZVjQSVFDEYIPsnoSOXQY+W3Eb4+SOn9o4J5SQmFOP+Jecjf3ioFwUdsrFjAGkUUOHPvSbNWkGKtNuGm+C6r3aI3JBCFGPqX3ITgZYV76CF7JJJ5hPGaG8YH/XdmxVIeFfD3M39FQCncMyyq7xJJvwKKP1mzS5s1vNQie8hbQ9owRjtqvoWcmM9GEYCUHNcMPLjZc+CBrj8sfBbNTYgIFI4UtirOaRJvYymxXjmXuzeVYxQujMjAjgobxQ8QFv0zlYsHk+gS5EYyafpJG9zmfCFSoF9+ZwqKNADmuADbISD9LZIH/bmkPoNXhxaeFPqYog==" ),
public_key: "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsYMEs4waqk/6gaS+xn1T\nYygElTtNIFNkBcEdEBMaeoGVhyZiVKtSjJCS4z+X+394PKvcfSTcFILIt2GI2jOB\nHD0M2fFgxc8mmdSdCQkgEh9jF3bFI3kopDvzYf726iioYKlHXKpfPKvFt7EJgKH7\naCtS25NQkek3YUd6y3VBcT3R6Xhze9P3QNoZMIsFXklgXDKj+EllfbUqLf1vxt3s\nmD9ETxy2bJi9FheE0uY2WhARn49XAvwczM5Wzt+zqxVEtgpi5v2+ZZAVKhDnJkiC\nCCuI6hrSnKNIx/5mSlX0a0S5h5d03djrCkYsqmwelu01rhOXP2grsz4BXp0y2wrO\n3QIDAQAB\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n",
algorithm: "sha256"
);

echo $verified;

Copy and paste that into PHP and you should see that $verified is true.

NOW EXPLAIN THE CODE

Say please.

PLEASE!!!

Along with the message sent to your server, you will have received HTTP headers like this:

 content-digest: sha-256=:tFdB/ENGczHMlZMDb66pXoUi2d0OqH2iBHdnN/WV1mc=:
signature: sig1=:sIfmNsM/Q8iG6AJlne1IkZVjQSVFDEYIPsnoSOXQY+W3Eb4+SOn9o4J5SQmFOP+Jecjf3ioFwUdsrFjAGkUUOHPvSbNWkGKtNuGm+C6r3aI3JBCFGPqX3ITgZYV76CF7JJJ5hPGaG8YH/XdmxVIeFfD3M39FQCncMyyq7xJJvwKKP1mzS5s1vNQie8hbQ9owRjtqvoWcmM9GEYCUHNcMPLjZc+CBrj8sfBbNTYgIFI4UtirOaRJvYymxXjmXuzeVYxQujMjAjgobxQ8QFv0zlYsHk+gS5EYyafpJG9zmfCFSoF9+ZwqKNADmuADbISD9LZIH/bmkPoNXhxaeFPqYog==:
signature-input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest");created=1787780262;keyid="https://mastodon.social/users/Edent#main-key"

The signature-input tells you how to construct a "Signature Base". You have to build a text string which places the various components in the order specified and separated with a newline:

 "@method": POST
"@target-uri": https://example.viii.fi/inbox
"content-digest": sha-256=:tFdB/ENGczHMlZMDb66pXoUi2d0OqH2iBHdnN/WV1mc=:
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest");created=1787780262;keyid="https://mastodon.social/users/Edent#main-key"

Where @method is the HTTP method used to send data to your server (usually GET or POST), and @target-uri is the URl the message was sent to (usually your inbox).

The publicKey is slightly trickier. As you can see, the signature-input ends with keyid="https://mastodon.social/users/Edent#main-key

If you make a signed request to that URl, you'll get back an ActivityPub Actor document. It will look something like this:

 JSON{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
"https://w3id.org/security/v1",
],
"id": "https://mastodon.social/users/Edent",
"webfinger": "Edent@mastodon.social",
"type": "Person",
"name": "Terence Eden",
"publicKey": {
"id": "https://mastodon.social/users/Edent#main-key",
"owner": "https://mastodon.social/users/Edent",
"publicKeyPem": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsYMEs4waqk/6gaS+xn1T\nYygElTtNIFNkBcEdEBMaeoGVhyZiVKtSjJCS4z+X+394PKvcfSTcFILIt2GI2jOB\nHD0M2fFgxc8mmdSdCQkgEh9jF3bFI3kopDvzYf726iioYKlHXKpfPKvFt7EJgKH7\naCtS25NQkek3YUd6y3VBcT3R6Xhze9P3QNoZMIsFXklgXDKj+EllfbUqLf1vxt3s\nmD9ETxy2bJi9FheE0uY2WhARn49XAvwczM5Wzt+zqxVEtgpi5v2+ZZAVKhDnJkiC\nCCuI6hrSnKNIx/5mSlX0a0S5h5d03djrCkYsqmwelu01rhOXP2grsz4BXp0y2wrO\n3QIDAQAB\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
},

The publicKeyPem is the string you need. There's no need to convert the \n to literal newlines.

Is that it?

Not quite! All we've done so far is verify the headers. It is possible that these are genuine headers but attached to a fraudulent body.

This takes us back to the header "content-digest": sha-256=:tFdB/ENGczHMlZMDb66pXoUi2d0OqH2iBHdnN/WV1mc=:

That says that the body of the message sent has a Base64 encoded SHA256 hash of tFdB/ENGczHMlZMDb66pXoUi2d0OqH2iBHdnN/WV1mc=.

To calculate your own content digest in PHP:

 PHP$input = file_get_contents( "php://input" );
$digestCalculated = base64_encode(
hash(
algo: "sha256",
data: $input,
binary: true
)
);

Does your digest match the one sent along with the headers? If not, something dodgy is going on.

Putting it all together

The steps are:

1. Get the headers.
2. Get the body.
3. From the headers' content-digest extract the algorithm and hash.
4. Using the body, calculate your own hash using the algorithm from content-digest.
5. Does your hash match the sent hash? If not, stop. If so, proceed.
6. From the headers' signature extract the base64 encoded signature.
7. From the headers' signature-input extract the signature-input string.
8. From the signature-input string extract the order of the Signature Base.
9. Construct the Signature Base.
10. From the signature-input string extract the keyid.
11. Get the Public Key from the keyid.
12. Use openssl_verify() to verify the Signature Base and the base64 decoded signature, against the Public Key using SHA256.

Note, Mastodon only uses SHA256. I think it should explicitly say which algorithm it is using and have raised the issue.

In Code Form

This is how you do it in PHP. Please read this carefully as there are some hard-coded assumptions.

 PHP<?php// Validate the Digest.// It is the hash of the raw input string, in binary, encoded as base64.// The format is content-digest => <algorithm>=:<base64 encoded hash>:$digestString = $headers["content-digest"];
// The Base64 encoding may have multiple `=` at the end. So split this at the first `=`.$digestData = explode( separator: "=", string: $digestString, limit: 2 );

// Hashes are in lowercase, but have a `-` in their name.// This is not what hash_algos() expects.$digestAlgorithm = str_replace( search: "-", replace: "", subject: $digestData[0] );

// The hash is surrounded by `:` characters.$digestHash = str_replace( search: ":", replace: "", subject: $digestData[1] );

// Check if the hash algorithm is one known about to PHP.// If not, reject and record an error.if ( !in_array( needle:$digestAlgorithm, haystack: hash_algos() ) ) {
return false;
}

// Manually calculate the digest based on the data sent.$digestCalculated = base64_encode( hash( algo: $digestAlgorithm, data: $input, binary: true ) );

// Does our calculation match what was sent?if ( !( $digestCalculated == $digestHash ) ) {
return false;
}

// The signature format is signature => <signature name>=:<base64 encoded hash>:$signatureString = $headers["signature"];
// The Base64 encoding may have multiple `=` at the end. So split this at the first `=`.$signatureData = explode( separator: "=", string: $signatureString, limit: 2 );
$signatureName = $signatureData[0];

// The signature is surrounded by `:` characters.$signatureB64 = str_replace( search: ":", replace: "", subject: $signatureData[1] );

// The signature-input format is complicated!$signatureInputString = $headers["signature-input"];

// Get the parameters. Assume there is only one signature.$signatureParamsString = explode( separator: "=", string: $signatureInputString, limit: 2 )[1];

// Get the different elements of the signature.$signatureInputData = explode( separator: ";", string: $signatureInputString );

// Construct the data.$signatureInput = [];
foreach( $signatureInputData as $signatureInputParts ) {
$partsData = explode( separator: "=", string: $signatureInputParts );
// Strip quotes from keyid and parentheses from sig1.
if ( "keyid" == $partsData[0] ) {
$partsData[1] = str_replace( search: "\"", replace: "", subject: $partsData[1] );
}

if ( $signatureName == $partsData[0] ) {
$partsData[1] = str_replace( search: ["(", ")"], replace: "", subject: $partsData[1] );
}

$signatureInput[ $partsData[0] ] = $partsData[1] ;
}

$signatureStructure = $signatureInput[$signatureName];
$signatureKeyID = $signatureInput["keyid"];

// Remove quotes.$signatureStructure = str_replace( search: "\"", replace: "", subject: $signatureStructure );
$signatureStructureData = explode( separator: " ", string: $signatureStructure );

// https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421/#section-2.5$signatureBase = "";
foreach ( $signatureStructureData as $signatureStructureParts ) {
if ( "@method" == $signatureStructureParts ) {
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421/#name-method
$signatureBase .= "\"@method\": " . $_SERVER["REQUEST_METHOD"] . "\n";
}
if ( "@target-uri" == $signatureStructureParts ) {
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421/#section-2.2.2
// Change the domain name to your own.
$signatureBase .= "\"@target-uri\": https://EXAMPLE.COM" . $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] . "\n";
}
if ( "content-digest" == $signatureStructureParts ) {
$signatureBase .= "\"content-digest\": $digestString\n";
}
}

// https://victoronsoftware.com/posts/http-message-signatures/#how-the-signature-is-created$signatureBase .= "\"@signature-params\": $signatureParamsString";

// Get the signing user's public key.// This is usually in the form `https://example.com/user/username#main-key`// This is to differentiate if the user has multiple keys.// This may need to be a signed request. You will need to write your own getDataFromURl() function to get the sending user's key.$userData = getDataFromURl( $signatureKeyID );
$publicKey = $userData["publicKey"]["publicKeyPem"];

// Verify the request$verified = openssl_verify(
data: $signatureBase,
signature: base64_decode( $signatureB64 ),
public_key: $publicKey,
algorithm: $digestAlgorithm
);

// Convert the result to boolean.if ( $verified === 1 ) {
$verified = true;
} elseif ( $verified === 0 ) {
$verified = false;
} else {
$verified = null;
}

return $verified;

Further Reading

• RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures
• Understanding HTTP message signatures: A developer's guide
• Sign and verify HTTP messages (RFC 9421)
• Verification of HTTP Message Signatures
• HTTP-Message-Signer in PHP

Thanks to NLnet

This blog post was funded in part by the work I'm doing for my NLnet NGI0 grant. Thanks!

This release encompasses two broad sets of changes: widening the pool of candidates for feeds and more carefully checking the origin of inbound activities (broadly FEP-fe34, Origin-based security model).

Candidates for feeds were originally limited to posts in the actor's mailboxes. This decision made authorization easy but omitted clearly acceptable posts (for example, posts addressed to the public collection) that arrived via other means (for example, filling in a thread).

Prior to this release, inbox processing did not consistently define an object's origin nor did it apply consistent rules to what it admitted based on the origin.

FEP-fe34 is still not fully enforced, and truth be told, I'm still reviewing some of its mandates, so I'm not yet listing it in Ktistec's federation documentation.

Here's the full list of changes:

Added

• Notify a deck pane when it has new posts.

Fixed

• Retry an unresolved quote authorization.
• Label a draft with the status of its quote request.
• Compare origins when deciding whether to trust an IRI, key document, or owner.
• Ignore a trailing slash when matching a dereferenced document's IRI.
• Allow only Create and Update to update objects.
• Ignore an inbound vote that fails the FEP-9967 checks.
• Expand commonly omitted ActivityStreams context terms.
• Break a long link rather than let it overflow.

Changed

• Widen the feed scan to every object the server holds.
• Address a published feed by slug rather than by id.

Removed

• The proxyUrl property from the actor document.

I am still working hard on the feed deck. Both notifications and feed ordering now work. It's now my preferred reading interface, and should be ready by the next release!

#ktistec #crystallang #activitypub #fediverse

#Vernissage 1.43.0 is out! 🎉

This release brings better image uploads, Geohash support, improved likes/comments, AI support while editing statuses, and fixes across SSR, datepicker, AP objects handling, WebFinger, search and more.

More here:
https://github.com/VernissageApp/VernissageServer/releases/tag/v1.43.0

And here:
https://github.com/VernissageApp/VernissageWeb/releases/tag/v1.43.0

Thank you for your continued support and help! ❤️