FEP-fe34 (Origin-based security model) update : https://codeberg.org/fediverse/fep/pulls/849
I tried to better explain the assumptions on which the model is based, and clarified how exactly origins should enforce boundaries between actors:
Servers MUST ensure that activities published by a client do not represent unauthorized actions. This includes activities embedded within other activities and objects.
Servers MUST NOT allow clients to publish activities where embedded objects are owned by another actor.
Lemmy API and Mastodon API implementers don't have to worry about this, but one needs to be very careful when accepting arbitrary payloads from clients, for example, when implementing ActivityPub C2S API or FEP-ae97 API. Unfortunately, these security issues are completely ignored by people who push for wide deployment of ActivityPub C2S API.
Another addition is the recommendation to not use partially embedded objects, because that might lead to cache poisoning:
Embedded non-anonymous objects SHOULD NOT be partial representations. A server that relies on embedding for authentication might save a partial representation of an object to the cache, replacing the full object.
(see this issue for details: https://codeberg.org/silverpill/feps/issues/21)