"If you can turn off secure boot with a couple of clicks how is it secure" is a question I got asked today that I did not have a good answer for.
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I know the theory, I get it, but when you watch an absolute nonspecialist, wholly new to Linux or installing an OS at all encounter secureboot for the first time, and what they learn is "this is an obstacle to me doing something I want with my computer, but I can turn it off with three clicks", a reasonable person might reasonably conclude that this might be some bullshit that isn't protecting anyone from anything real.
To be fair, it actually *is* some bullshit that isn't protecting anyone from anything real.
(The primary goal of SB is to protect your data from a specific type of high-cost targeted attack that affects C-level executives and nobody else. If you're not carrying investment plans or nuclear launch codes, turn it off and use full-disk encryption instead. That's all you need.)
@suetanvil @mhoye If an attacker can "borrow" your computer to overwrite GRUB or the kernel with a backdoored one - they can also "borrow" your computer to quickly open it up and intercept the keyboard port. Or just hide a PCI-E to USB adapter and an Arduino inside the case that claims to be an USB HID and will do whatever the attacker wants on next power up.
That latter approach is actually slightly _easier_ than backdooring a kernel.