@yoginho @anilkseth sorry, first my post was kind of confusing so I edited it to try and be clearer. But the standard notion of what it means to be a mental state is to either be a conscious state *or* an intentional state. So to reject functionilism (and computationalism) it's not enough to establish the idea that 'consciousness' can't be understood in computational terms, because that leaves the sense of mental state as intentional state (e.g., belief) intact.
That matters in this context particularly (I think), because our theories of language or reasoning in psychology typically make little to no reference to consciousness whatsoever...
in that context, you're offering an opinion that to have mental states you have to have a locus of experience, which seems to be just asserting that, in fact, there is just one way to be a 'mental state' - which runs counter to the standard construal in philosophy (on my limited understanding), so isn't something you can just marshall as a premise. At best, it's a really substantive conclusion that requires a lot of work to establish, no?
