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Hacker News
@h4ckernews@mastodon.social  ·  activity timestamp 2 weeks ago

Hardening the C++ Standard Library at scale

https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3773097

#HackerNews #C++ #Standard #Library #Hardening #Scalability #SoftwareDevelopment

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Stefano Marinelli boosted
Larvitz
@Larvitz@mastodon.bsd.cafe  ·  activity timestamp last month

Proper FreeBSD system hardning :)
(all for sysctl)

security.bsd.see_other_uids
security.bsd.see_other_gids
--> Don't show other users processes

security.bsd.unprivileged_read_msgbuf
--> Don't allow unprivileges to read kernel buffer (dmesg)

security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug
--> Don't allow unprivileged to use debugging

security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid
security.bsd.hardlink_check_gid
--> restrict hardlinks to same user/group

kern.elf64.aslr.enable
kern.elf32.aslr.enable
--> Enable kernel address randomization (ASLR)

security.bsd.unprivileged_mlock
--> Restrict unprivileged users from loading kernel modules

sysctl kern.securelevel=1
--> Cannot lower securelevel
--> Cannot write directly to mounted disks
--> Cannot write to /dev/mem or /dev/kmem
--> Cannot load/unload kernel modules
--> Cannot change firewall rules (if compiled with IPFIREWALL_STATIC)
--> System immutable and append-only file flags cannot be removed

This can make a FreeBSD system more secure, especially on multi-user systems. Securelevel ca even go higher, but those restrictions generally need care.

#runbsd #freebsd #security #hardening #goodpractice #devops #sysadmin

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Larvitz
@Larvitz@mastodon.bsd.cafe  ·  activity timestamp last month

Proper FreeBSD system hardning :)
(all for sysctl)

security.bsd.see_other_uids
security.bsd.see_other_gids
--> Don't show other users processes

security.bsd.unprivileged_read_msgbuf
--> Don't allow unprivileges to read kernel buffer (dmesg)

security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug
--> Don't allow unprivileged to use debugging

security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid
security.bsd.hardlink_check_gid
--> restrict hardlinks to same user/group

kern.elf64.aslr.enable
kern.elf32.aslr.enable
--> Enable kernel address randomization (ASLR)

security.bsd.unprivileged_mlock
--> Restrict unprivileged users from loading kernel modules

sysctl kern.securelevel=1
--> Cannot lower securelevel
--> Cannot write directly to mounted disks
--> Cannot write to /dev/mem or /dev/kmem
--> Cannot load/unload kernel modules
--> Cannot change firewall rules (if compiled with IPFIREWALL_STATIC)
--> System immutable and append-only file flags cannot be removed

This can make a FreeBSD system more secure, especially on multi-user systems. Securelevel ca even go higher, but those restrictions generally need care.

#runbsd #freebsd #security #hardening #goodpractice #devops #sysadmin

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