The UK’s Online Safety Act: A Lesson in Technosolutionism

The United Kingdom has just delivered the world’s most expensive demonstration of why throwing technology at social problems doesn’t work. After two years of ignoring expert advice and billions in compliance costs, the UK’s Online Safety Act has achieved the opposite of its stated goal by making the internet less safe.

Six months into enforcement, Britain’s techno-solutionist fantasy has crashed into reality with predictable results. Beneficial online communities have been obliterated, VPN adoption has surged 1,400%, and the UK has created a perfect case study for why governments can’t regulate away complex social problems with algorithmic band-aids and surveillance theater.

If you wanted to design legislation to eliminate the internet’s safest spaces for vulnerable people, you couldn’t improve on the UK’s approach. The Act’s most spectacular own-goal has been systematically destroying community-run websites that provided genuine social support.

Consider Microcosm’s 300 community websites serving 275,000 monthly users. These weren’t dark corners of the internet. They were cycling forums, parenting advice sites, and local community hubs where people actually knew each other. Dee Kitchen, who ran these communities for nearly three decades, captured the government’s logic perfectly: “It’s too vague and too broad and I don’t want to take that personal risk.”

The community websites closed specifically because age verification would destroy the trust and openness that made them safe spaces. As site administrators noted: “The impact that these forums have had on the lives of so many cannot be understated… approximately 28 years and 9 months of providing almost 500 forums in total to what is likely a half a million people.”

Meanwhile, harmful content on major platforms continues largely unabated. Tech giants with billion-dollar compliance budgets simply absorb fines as operating costs. TikTok’s £1.875 million penalty represents roughly 0.01% of ByteDance’s $155 billion annual revenue, making it count less than a virtual parking ticket.

Perhaps the crown jewel of the UK’s techno-solutionist delusion is demanding “safe” encryption backdoors. Despite government admission that the necessary technology “does not yet exist,” officials refused to let inconsequential details like reality or mathematics interfere with their mandates.

Ciaran Martin, who founded the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, called out this “magical thinking”, essentially the belief that encryption can be weakened for government access while remaining strong against everyone else. This isn’t a technical challenge; it’s a fundamental impossibility as the Global Encryption Coalition noted.

Even the tech industry’s response was swift and unified. Signal, WhatsApp, and Apple essentially told the UK government to choose between secure communications and backdoors. Instead of magically solving encryption, the UK triggered a 1,400% surge in VPN adoption as users decided to route around the government’s technical incompetence rather than submit to it.

In other failures, within days of enforcement, automated systems were treating Conservative MP posts about grooming gangs, police arrest footage, and parliamentary speeches exactly like genuinely harmful content. This wasn’t a bug, it’s the inevitable result of the futility of trying to teach machines to understand human context, intent, and meaning.

When platforms face £18 million fines for missing harmful content, they predictably err toward censoring everything that might possibly be problematic, including discussions of the very problems they’re supposed to solve.

The meta-censorship problem showcases the system’s absurdity: documentation of censored content gets censored, creating a feedback loop where evidence of the system’s failures becomes impossible to discuss publicly. It’s compliance theater at its finest. It is visible enough to inconvenience ordinary users, yet ineffective enough to let determined bad actors adapt around it.

This reveals the UK’s techno-solutionism’s true beneficiaries: tech giants who can afford compliance theater while their smaller competitors get regulated out of existence. Meta and Google can absorb billions in compliance costs; community forums run by volunteers cannot.

he threshold-based requirements create what researchers call ‘vastly disproportionate compliance incentives’, which is academic speak for “we’ve built a regulatory country club and labeled it child safety.” The UK has essentially using child safety as cover for the largest anti-competitive regulation in internet history, with the result being an internet that’s simultaneously less safe and less accessible.

Not to be outdone, the European Union watched the UK’s comprehensive failure and decided to ask them to hold their beer. The EU is implementing almost identical age verification systems that require Big Tech technology as a key dependency while pursuing deeply unpopular “chat control” legislation that is planned be adopted by October 2025.

Despite Poland’s EU Presidency giving up on voluntary chat scanning, the fundamental legislative momentum continues unchanged. European policymakers have learned nothing from watching their neighbours systematically destroy beneficial online communities while failing to protect children. They’re implementing the same impossible technical requirements, ignoring the same expert warnings, and expecting different results.

The UK’s experiment has produced one unambiguously successful outcome: the largest grassroots digital rights movement in British history. Over 290,000 citizens have signed petitions demanding repeal, which is impressive political engagement for any cause, let alone internet infrastructure policy.

Proton VPN reported that 1,400% increase in UK signups within hours of enforcement, noting this was “sustained and significantly higher than when France lost access to adult content.” Multiple VPN providers reported similar surges, with privacy apps dominating UK App Store charts for weeks.

The circumvention became so widespread that Ofcom demanded platforms prohibit content encouraging VPN use, creating a perfectly Orwellian situation where discussing privacy tools becomes prohibited speech under legislation supposedly designed to protect online safety.

The UK’s experiment inadvertently provided a perfect demonstration of what makes the internet genuinely safer: community-based moderation, user empowerment, and addressing real-world social problems that manifest online.

The forums destroyed by the Act had operated safely for decades through transparent governance, engaged user communities, and voluntary compliance with clear standards. These spaces worked because they created genuine human relationships where inappropriate content was quickly identified and addressed by people who actually cared about the community’s wellbeing.

Technical mandates destroy these approaches by replacing human judgment and community accountability with automated systems that users cannot understand, appeal, or improve. When algorithms make moderation decisions, users lose agency over their own spaces, communities lose the ability to set their own standards, and the social dynamics that create genuine safety disappear.

This expensive UK experiment offers the world a choice: learn from their mistakes or repeat them at even greater scale. The evidence is overwhelming that age verification systems, encryption backdoors, and automated content moderation create more problems than they solve while systematically destroying community-based approaches that actually work.

The lesson is clear but politically inconvenient: protecting people online often begins offline, and requires addressing factors like social isolation, inadequate education, economic inequality, and lack of community support. Online factors can also help, but those require giving users agency to manage their own communities, and investing in digital literacy. Unfortunately these solutions involve long-term investment in unglamorous things like schools, social services, and community programs, not exciting technology mandates that primarily serve our big tech overlords.

Digital Sovereignty in Practice: Web Browsers as a Reality Check

Reading in Servo’s latest weekly report that it’s now passing 1.7 million Web Platform Subtests, I started wondering: How much investment would it build it into a competitive, independent browser, in the context of all this talk on digital sovereignty?

Servo is an experimental web browser engine written in Rust, originally developed by Mozilla Research as a memory-safe, parallel alternative to traditional browser engines like Gecko and WebKit. After Mozilla laid off the entire Servo team in 2020, the project was transferred to Linux Foundation Europe, where it continues to be developed with minimal funding from individual donors and Igalia, a team of just five engineers. Servo’s progress demonstrates what’s possible with intentional investment in independent browser projects.

As initiatives like EuroStack propose €300 billion investments in digital infrastructure and researchers proposing comprehensive roadmaps for “reclaiming digital sovereignty” through democratic, public-led digital stacks, browsers are an ideal test case to ground these ambitious visions in reality.

The current browser landscape reveals how concentrated digital control has become. Roughly 75% of global web traffic flows through browsers based on Google’s Chromium engine; not just Chrome, but Microsoft Edge, Samsung, and dozens of others. Apple’s Safari dominates iOS but remains locked to their ecosystem. Firefox, once a genuine alternative, has declined to under 5% market share globally. This means American companies control how billions of users worldwide access the web. Every search, transaction, and digital service flows through infrastructure ultimately controlled by Silicon Valley. For societies valuing their independence and sovereignty, this represents a fundamental vulnerability that recent geopolitical events have made impossible to ignore.

Digital infrastructure is as important as energy or transportation networks. Unlike physical infrastructure, however, digital systems can be controlled remotely, updated unilaterally, and modified to serve the interests of their controllers rather than their users. Browsers exemplify this challenge because they’re both critical and seemingly replaceable. In theory, anyone can build a browser. The web standards are open, and rendering engines like Servo prove it’s technically feasible.

In practice, building browsers requires sustained investment, institutional coordination, and overcoming network effects that entrench existing players. If democratic societies can successfully coordinate to build and maintain competitive browser alternatives, it demonstrates their capacity for more complex digital sovereignty goals. If they cannot, it reveals the institutional gaps that need addressing.

Firefox offers important lessons about the challenges facing independent browsers. Mozilla has indeed faced difficulties: declining market share, organizational challenges, and ongoing technical issues. The organization has also alienated its most dedicated supporters by pivoting toward advertising, AI initiatives and cutting their impactful public advocacy programs.

However, Firefox remains the only major browser engine not controlled by Apple or Google, serving hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Its struggles reflect structural challenges that any alternative browser would face: the enormous engineering effort required to maintain web compatibility, the network effects favouring dominant platforms, and the difficulty of sustaining long-term technical projects through diverse funding sources.

Servo’s recent progress illustrates both the potential and the resource constraints of independent browser development. Since 2023, Igalia’s team of just five engineers has increased Servo’s Web Platform Test pass rate from 40.8% to 62.0%, added Android support, and made the engine embeddable in other applications, even demonstrating better performance than Chromium on Raspberry Pi. This progress on a shoestring budget shows what focused investment could achieve, while also highlighting how resource-constrained independent browser development remains.

Yet, building a competitive alternative browser infrastructure would require substantial but manageable investment. Here is a ballpark estimation I made based on existing browsers: Annual operating costs would include:

• Engineering Team of ±50 developers, designers, managers etc.: €15 million.
• Quality Assurance and Testing Infrastructure: €10 million
• Security Auditing and Vulnerability Management: €10 million
• Standards and Specification Development: €5 million.

At this point I would just round up to around 50-70 million annually, which I’m sure would comfortably cover everything I missed. The proposed EuroStack initiative already envisions €300 billion over multiple years. Browsers represent a tiny fraction of what democratic societies already spend on strategic infrastructure. This calculation proves that the cost isn’t the primary barrier: the European Space Agency for example has had a budget of €7.8 billion in 2024. Europe can afford to build a browser.

It would probably take around 3-4 years to fully build an alternative browser from scratch, less so if it’s a fork of one of the existing ones. Forking Chromium/Gecko or building upon Servo’s foundation could reduce this timeline to 18-24 months for basic functionality, though achieving full web compatibility and market readiness would still require several additional years of refinement. The initial development sprint needs to be followed by a sustained engineering effort needed afterward, for maintaining compatibility with evolving web standards, fixing security vulnerabilities, and keeping pace with performance improvements.

The core challenge isn’t technical; it’s institutional. How do you sustain long-term technical projects through democratic processes that span multiple countries with different priorities, resources, and political systems? Successful models exist. The European Space Agency coordinates complex multi-national technical projects. CERN manages cutting-edge research infrastructure across dozens of countries. The Internet Engineering Task Force maintains critical internet standards through voluntary coordination among global stakeholders. The “Reclaiming Digital Sovereignity” proposal specifically addresses this challenge by advocating for “new public institutions with state and civil society representation” to govern universal digital platforms, alongside “multilateral agreements on principles and rules for the internet” as safeguards for autonomous, democratically governed solutions.

Browser development could follow similar patterns: international frameworks that respect national sovereignty while enabling coordinated action, governance structures that balance technical expertise with democratic accountability, and funding mechanisms that provide stability across political cycles. The Reclaiming Digital Sovereignity’s report’s emphasis on “democratic international consortia” and “public knowledge networks led by a new public international research agency” provides concrete institutional models that could be adapted for browser development. Germany’s Sovereign Tech Agency represents another model for public investment in digital infrastructure for the public interest.

With all that being said, browsers represent one of the more achievable digital sovereignty goals. They’re built on open standards, rely heavily on open source components, and face fewer network effects than platform-based services. Other areas of the technology stack would be far more challenging, and far less open.

Success here would demonstrate that democratic societies can coordinate effectively on complex technical infrastructure and pass the first hurdle. Failure would reveal institutional gaps that need addressing before attempting more ambitious digital sovereignty goals. Democratic digital sovereignty is challenging but feasible, if societies are willing to think institutionally, invest sustainably, and build incrementally rather than trying to recreate Silicon Valley with different ownership structures.

Ultimately, the real question isn’t whether democratic societies can build alternative technologies, but whether they can build the democratic institutions necessary to govern them effectively across the complex realities of international coordination, competing priorities, and long-term sustainability. I believe browsers offer an ideal place to start testing these institutional innovations. The technical challenges are surmountable. The institutional ones remain to be proven.

Views expressed are personal and do not represent any organization.

#digitalSovereignity #funding #internetStandards #openSource #publicInterest

The UK’s Online Safety Act: A Lesson in Technosolutionism

The United Kingdom has just delivered the world’s most expensive demonstration of why throwing technology at social problems doesn’t work. After two years of ignoring expert advice and billions in compliance costs, the UK’s Online Safety Act has achieved the opposite of its stated goal by making the internet less safe.

Six months into enforcement, Britain’s techno-solutionist fantasy has crashed into reality with predictable results. Beneficial online communities have been obliterated, VPN adoption has surged 1,400%, and the UK has created a perfect case study for why governments can’t regulate away complex social problems with algorithmic band-aids and surveillance theater.

If you wanted to design legislation to eliminate the internet’s safest spaces for vulnerable people, you couldn’t improve on the UK’s approach. The Act’s most spectacular own-goal has been systematically destroying community-run websites that provided genuine social support.

Consider Microcosm’s 300 community websites serving 275,000 monthly users. These weren’t dark corners of the internet. They were cycling forums, parenting advice sites, and local community hubs where people actually knew each other. Dee Kitchen, who ran these communities for nearly three decades, captured the government’s logic perfectly: “It’s too vague and too broad and I don’t want to take that personal risk.”

The community websites closed specifically because age verification would destroy the trust and openness that made them safe spaces. As site administrators noted: “The impact that these forums have had on the lives of so many cannot be understated… approximately 28 years and 9 months of providing almost 500 forums in total to what is likely a half a million people.”

Meanwhile, harmful content on major platforms continues largely unabated. Tech giants with billion-dollar compliance budgets simply absorb fines as operating costs. TikTok’s £1.875 million penalty represents roughly 0.01% of ByteDance’s $155 billion annual revenue, making it count less than a virtual parking ticket.

Perhaps the crown jewel of the UK’s techno-solutionist delusion is demanding “safe” encryption backdoors. Despite government admission that the necessary technology “does not yet exist,” officials refused to let inconsequential details like reality or mathematics interfere with their mandates.

Ciaran Martin, who founded the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, called out this “magical thinking”, essentially the belief that encryption can be weakened for government access while remaining strong against everyone else. This isn’t a technical challenge; it’s a fundamental impossibility as the Global Encryption Coalition noted.

Even the tech industry’s response was swift and unified. Signal, WhatsApp, and Apple essentially told the UK government to choose between secure communications and backdoors. Instead of magically solving encryption, the UK triggered a 1,400% surge in VPN adoption as users decided to route around the government’s technical incompetence rather than submit to it.

In other failures, within days of enforcement, automated systems were treating Conservative MP posts about grooming gangs, police arrest footage, and parliamentary speeches exactly like genuinely harmful content. This wasn’t a bug, it’s the inevitable result of the futility of trying to teach machines to understand human context, intent, and meaning.

When platforms face £18 million fines for missing harmful content, they predictably err toward censoring everything that might possibly be problematic, including discussions of the very problems they’re supposed to solve.

The meta-censorship problem showcases the system’s absurdity: documentation of censored content gets censored, creating a feedback loop where evidence of the system’s failures becomes impossible to discuss publicly. It’s compliance theater at its finest. It is visible enough to inconvenience ordinary users, yet ineffective enough to let determined bad actors adapt around it.

This reveals the UK’s techno-solutionism’s true beneficiaries: tech giants who can afford compliance theater while their smaller competitors get regulated out of existence. Meta and Google can absorb billions in compliance costs; community forums run by volunteers cannot.

he threshold-based requirements create what researchers call ‘vastly disproportionate compliance incentives’, which is academic speak for “we’ve built a regulatory country club and labeled it child safety.” The UK has essentially using child safety as cover for the largest anti-competitive regulation in internet history, with the result being an internet that’s simultaneously less safe and less accessible.

Not to be outdone, the European Union watched the UK’s comprehensive failure and decided to ask them to hold their beer. The EU is implementing almost identical age verification systems that require Big Tech technology as a key dependency while pursuing deeply unpopular “chat control” legislation that is planned be adopted by October 2025.

Despite Poland’s EU Presidency giving up on voluntary chat scanning, the fundamental legislative momentum continues unchanged. European policymakers have learned nothing from watching their neighbours systematically destroy beneficial online communities while failing to protect children. They’re implementing the same impossible technical requirements, ignoring the same expert warnings, and expecting different results.

The UK’s experiment has produced one unambiguously successful outcome: the largest grassroots digital rights movement in British history. Over 290,000 citizens have signed petitions demanding repeal, which is impressive political engagement for any cause, let alone internet infrastructure policy.

Proton VPN reported that 1,400% increase in UK signups within hours of enforcement, noting this was “sustained and significantly higher than when France lost access to adult content.” Multiple VPN providers reported similar surges, with privacy apps dominating UK App Store charts for weeks.

The circumvention became so widespread that Ofcom demanded platforms prohibit content encouraging VPN use, creating a perfectly Orwellian situation where discussing privacy tools becomes prohibited speech under legislation supposedly designed to protect online safety.

The UK’s experiment inadvertently provided a perfect demonstration of what makes the internet genuinely safer: community-based moderation, user empowerment, and addressing real-world social problems that manifest online.

The forums destroyed by the Act had operated safely for decades through transparent governance, engaged user communities, and voluntary compliance with clear standards. These spaces worked because they created genuine human relationships where inappropriate content was quickly identified and addressed by people who actually cared about the community’s wellbeing.

Technical mandates destroy these approaches by replacing human judgment and community accountability with automated systems that users cannot understand, appeal, or improve. When algorithms make moderation decisions, users lose agency over their own spaces, communities lose the ability to set their own standards, and the social dynamics that create genuine safety disappear.

This expensive UK experiment offers the world a choice: learn from their mistakes or repeat them at even greater scale. The evidence is overwhelming that age verification systems, encryption backdoors, and automated content moderation create more problems than they solve while systematically destroying community-based approaches that actually work.

The lesson is clear but politically inconvenient: protecting people online often begins offline, and requires addressing factors like social isolation, inadequate education, economic inequality, and lack of community support. Online factors can also help, but those require giving users agency to manage their own communities, and investing in digital literacy. Unfortunately these solutions involve long-term investment in unglamorous things like schools, social services, and community programs, not exciting technology mandates that primarily serve our big tech overlords.

Digital Sovereignty in Practice: Web Browsers as a Reality Check

Reading in Servo’s latest weekly report that it’s now passing 1.7 million Web Platform Subtests, I started wondering: How much investment would it build it into a competitive, independent browser, in the context of all this talk on digital sovereignty?

Servo is an experimental web browser engine written in Rust, originally developed by Mozilla Research as a memory-safe, parallel alternative to traditional browser engines like Gecko and WebKit. After Mozilla laid off the entire Servo team in 2020, the project was transferred to Linux Foundation Europe, where it continues to be developed with minimal funding from individual donors and Igalia, a team of just five engineers. Servo’s progress demonstrates what’s possible with intentional investment in independent browser projects.

As initiatives like EuroStack propose €300 billion investments in digital infrastructure and researchers proposing comprehensive roadmaps for “reclaiming digital sovereignty” through democratic, public-led digital stacks, browsers are an ideal test case to ground these ambitious visions in reality.

The current browser landscape reveals how concentrated digital control has become. Roughly 75% of global web traffic flows through browsers based on Google’s Chromium engine; not just Chrome, but Microsoft Edge, Samsung, and dozens of others. Apple’s Safari dominates iOS but remains locked to their ecosystem. Firefox, once a genuine alternative, has declined to under 5% market share globally. This means American companies control how billions of users worldwide access the web. Every search, transaction, and digital service flows through infrastructure ultimately controlled by Silicon Valley. For societies valuing their independence and sovereignty, this represents a fundamental vulnerability that recent geopolitical events have made impossible to ignore.

Digital infrastructure is as important as energy or transportation networks. Unlike physical infrastructure, however, digital systems can be controlled remotely, updated unilaterally, and modified to serve the interests of their controllers rather than their users. Browsers exemplify this challenge because they’re both critical and seemingly replaceable. In theory, anyone can build a browser. The web standards are open, and rendering engines like Servo prove it’s technically feasible.

In practice, building browsers requires sustained investment, institutional coordination, and overcoming network effects that entrench existing players. If democratic societies can successfully coordinate to build and maintain competitive browser alternatives, it demonstrates their capacity for more complex digital sovereignty goals. If they cannot, it reveals the institutional gaps that need addressing.

Firefox offers important lessons about the challenges facing independent browsers. Mozilla has indeed faced difficulties: declining market share, organizational challenges, and ongoing technical issues. The organization has also alienated its most dedicated supporters by pivoting toward advertising, AI initiatives and cutting their impactful public advocacy programs.

However, Firefox remains the only major browser engine not controlled by Apple or Google, serving hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Its struggles reflect structural challenges that any alternative browser would face: the enormous engineering effort required to maintain web compatibility, the network effects favouring dominant platforms, and the difficulty of sustaining long-term technical projects through diverse funding sources.

Servo’s recent progress illustrates both the potential and the resource constraints of independent browser development. Since 2023, Igalia’s team of just five engineers has increased Servo’s Web Platform Test pass rate from 40.8% to 62.0%, added Android support, and made the engine embeddable in other applications, even demonstrating better performance than Chromium on Raspberry Pi. This progress on a shoestring budget shows what focused investment could achieve, while also highlighting how resource-constrained independent browser development remains.

Yet, building a competitive alternative browser infrastructure would require substantial but manageable investment. Here is a ballpark estimation I made based on existing browsers: Annual operating costs would include:

• Engineering Team of ±50 developers, designers, managers etc.: €15 million.
• Quality Assurance and Testing Infrastructure: €10 million
• Security Auditing and Vulnerability Management: €10 million
• Standards and Specification Development: €5 million.

At this point I would just round up to around 50-70 million annually, which I’m sure would comfortably cover everything I missed. The proposed EuroStack initiative already envisions €300 billion over multiple years. Browsers represent a tiny fraction of what democratic societies already spend on strategic infrastructure. This calculation proves that the cost isn’t the primary barrier: the European Space Agency for example has had a budget of €7.8 billion in 2024. Europe can afford to build a browser.

It would probably take around 3-4 years to fully build an alternative browser from scratch, less so if it’s a fork of one of the existing ones. Forking Chromium/Gecko or building upon Servo’s foundation could reduce this timeline to 18-24 months for basic functionality, though achieving full web compatibility and market readiness would still require several additional years of refinement. The initial development sprint needs to be followed by a sustained engineering effort needed afterward, for maintaining compatibility with evolving web standards, fixing security vulnerabilities, and keeping pace with performance improvements.

The core challenge isn’t technical; it’s institutional. How do you sustain long-term technical projects through democratic processes that span multiple countries with different priorities, resources, and political systems? Successful models exist. The European Space Agency coordinates complex multi-national technical projects. CERN manages cutting-edge research infrastructure across dozens of countries. The Internet Engineering Task Force maintains critical internet standards through voluntary coordination among global stakeholders. The “Reclaiming Digital Sovereignity” proposal specifically addresses this challenge by advocating for “new public institutions with state and civil society representation” to govern universal digital platforms, alongside “multilateral agreements on principles and rules for the internet” as safeguards for autonomous, democratically governed solutions.

Browser development could follow similar patterns: international frameworks that respect national sovereignty while enabling coordinated action, governance structures that balance technical expertise with democratic accountability, and funding mechanisms that provide stability across political cycles. The Reclaiming Digital Sovereignity’s report’s emphasis on “democratic international consortia” and “public knowledge networks led by a new public international research agency” provides concrete institutional models that could be adapted for browser development. Germany’s Sovereign Tech Agency represents another model for public investment in digital infrastructure for the public interest.

With all that being said, browsers represent one of the more achievable digital sovereignty goals. They’re built on open standards, rely heavily on open source components, and face fewer network effects than platform-based services. Other areas of the technology stack would be far more challenging, and far less open.

Success here would demonstrate that democratic societies can coordinate effectively on complex technical infrastructure and pass the first hurdle. Failure would reveal institutional gaps that need addressing before attempting more ambitious digital sovereignty goals. Democratic digital sovereignty is challenging but feasible, if societies are willing to think institutionally, invest sustainably, and build incrementally rather than trying to recreate Silicon Valley with different ownership structures.

Ultimately, the real question isn’t whether democratic societies can build alternative technologies, but whether they can build the democratic institutions necessary to govern them effectively across the complex realities of international coordination, competing priorities, and long-term sustainability. I believe browsers offer an ideal place to start testing these institutional innovations. The technical challenges are surmountable. The institutional ones remain to be proven.

Views expressed are personal and do not represent any organization.

#digitalSovereignity #funding #internetStandards #openSource #publicInterest