Check: securemessagingapps.com rate 🟩=3 🟨=1 🟥=0 Results = 86 #ThreemaApp = most secure #Messenger 78 #SimpleX Chat 76 #Session 76 #Signal 66 #Wire 55 #Element / #Matrix 36 #Apple #iMessage 26 #Telegram 25 #WhatsApp 25 #Facebook Mess.
Might be a good time to download an encrypted, decentralized messaging app. Here’s some options:
Element Android, iOS, Windows, macOS, Linux, Web element.io
Session Android, iOS, Windows, macOS, Linux getsession.org
Wire Android, iOS, Windows, macOS, Linux, Web wire.com
Threema Android, iOS, Windows, macOS, Linux threema.ch
Ricochet Windows, macOS, Linux (Desktop only) ricochet.im
Check: securemessagingapps.com rate 🟩=3 🟨=1 🟥=0 Results = 86 #ThreemaApp = most secure #Messenger 78 #SimpleX Chat 76 #Session 76 #Signal 66 #Wire 55 #Element / #Matrix 36 #Apple #iMessage 26 #Telegram 25 #WhatsApp 25 #Facebook Mess.
So … I have been busy contributing to this
tldr: real-time #telegram archive of the Russian War against Ukraine.
It’s 100% built with Claude Code in a bit more than 2 months
it’s near 200.000 lines of #python code, without counting with documentation of course.
check it out ! http://v2.osintukraine.com
$[x2 Indian government decrees that WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, etc. must ensure continuous SIM binding with services]
Indian government has classified each of WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Arattai, Snapchat, ShareChat, JioChat, and Josh as a Telecommunication Identifier User Entity (TIUE)
TIUEs must fulfill a range of cybersecurity obligations
TIUEs must ensure that SIM cards remain continuously linked to their services, they must make it impossible for their users to use services without a SIM
For website or web-app-based access, TIUEs must ensure users are logged out periodically (not later than 6 hours) and must offer an option to relink accounts through a QR-code-based method
https://www.medianama.com/2025/11/223-dot-sim-binding-directions-to-whatsapp-and-telegram/
$[x2 Indian government decrees that WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, etc. must ensure continuous SIM binding with services]
Indian government has classified each of WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Arattai, Snapchat, ShareChat, JioChat, and Josh as a Telecommunication Identifier User Entity (TIUE)
TIUEs must fulfill a range of cybersecurity obligations
TIUEs must ensure that SIM cards remain continuously linked to their services, they must make it impossible for their users to use services without a SIM
For website or web-app-based access, TIUEs must ensure users are logged out periodically (not later than 6 hours) and must offer an option to relink accounts through a QR-code-based method
https://www.medianama.com/2025/11/223-dot-sim-binding-directions-to-whatsapp-and-telegram/
"Here you'll find reviews and research about services and how they affect your #privacy both in person and online backed by real world findings and data collected from testing"
Some apps analysed include: 
🏆 @simplex ( @threemaapp seems to be an undisputed winner on other lists)
🥈 @briar
🥉 @cwtch
https://privacyspreadsheet.com/messaging-apps
EDIT: this info is controversial (see comments)
#matrix #telegram #xmpp #signal #whatsapp #threema #wire #zoom #CWTCH
As part of the investigation, I have looked closely at Telegram's protocol and analyzed packet captures provided by IStories.
I have also done some packet captures of my own.
I dive into the nitty-gritty technical details of what I found and how I found it on my blog:
Telegram is indistinguishable from an FSB honeypot
https://rys.io/en/179.html
Yes, my packet captures and a small Python library I wrote in the process are all published along.
> Unauthorized access is not possible.
Unauthorized access to… what exactly? To the servers, which the story is not about? To data on the servers, which again, the story is not about?
Or do they mean the traffic? Because if they mean the traffic here, then GNM's access to it, as the networking provider, would be totally authorized after all.
So, either they are talking about something irrelevant (servers), or they make a statement that looks good but does not actually contradict the story.
🧵
> Telegram has neither employees nor servers in Russia.
There we go with the servers again!
Regarding employees – okay, so was Vedeneev a contractor? In the story he himself says that that the arrangement was "informal".
Telegram tries to pull a "Schrödinger's Vedeneev" here. He's an "employee" when handling the hardware in Florida, but not an "employee" in Russia? I guess?
Regardless, all that is beside the point, which is: traffic analysis and cleartext device identifier.
🧵
Telegram has responded to IStories' piece:
> All Telegram servers are Telegram’s property maintained by Telegram employees. Unauthorized access is not possible. Telegram has neither employees nor servers in Russia. In the entire history of Telegram, it has never handed over private messages to third parties, and its encryption has never been hacked
https://vot-tak.tv/87198696/fsb-chitaet-telegram
This answers exactly zero of the crucial points raised by the story. 
Let's dissect it! 🔍
🧵
> All Telegram servers are Telegram’s property maintained by Telegram employees.
👉 First: the story is not about the servers, it's about whose infrastructure the traffic flows through.
👉 Secondly: Vedeneev, the Russian owner of the infrastructure provider GNM used by Telegram, had signed documents as Telegram's CFO (would that qualify as "employee"?), and presented himself in Florida court as the person authorized to handle Telegram's servers.
🧵
As part of the investigation, I have looked closely at Telegram's protocol and analyzed packet captures provided by IStories.
I have also done some packet captures of my own.
I dive into the nitty-gritty technical details of what I found and how I found it on my blog:
Telegram is indistinguishable from an FSB honeypot
https://rys.io/en/179.html
Yes, my packet captures and a small Python library I wrote in the process are all published along.
Telegram has responded to IStories' piece:
> All Telegram servers are Telegram’s property maintained by Telegram employees. Unauthorized access is not possible. Telegram has neither employees nor servers in Russia. In the entire history of Telegram, it has never handed over private messages to third parties, and its encryption has never been hacked
https://vot-tak.tv/87198696/fsb-chitaet-telegram
This answers exactly zero of the crucial points raised by the story.
Let's dissect it! 🔍
🧵
As part of the investigation, I have looked closely at Telegram's protocol and analyzed packet captures provided by IStories.
I have also done some packet captures of my own.
I dive into the nitty-gritty technical details of what I found and how I found it on my blog:
Telegram is indistinguishable from an FSB honeypot
https://rys.io/en/179.html
Yes, my packet captures and a small Python library I wrote in the process are all published along.
Remarkable investigation into Telegram by IStories (in Russian):
https://www.istories.media/stories/2025/06/10/kak-telegram-svyazan-s-fsb/
English version by OCCRP:
http://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/telegram-the-fsb-and-the-man-in-the-middle
tl;dr:
👉 Telegram uses a single company with ties to the Russian FSB as their sole infrastructure provider, globally.
👉 Combined with a cleartext device identifier Telegram's protocol requires to be prepended to all encrypted messages, this allows for global surveillance of Telegram users.
I am quoted in this story.
Time to ditch #Telegram:
Telegram announces partnership with Musk's xAI - BBC News
