i still don't get why people use elliptic curves instead of diffie-hellman since you can use it for public keys too. the index calculus cryptanalytic method appears to apply for the usage of F_q where q = pn for some prime p. it appears that if q is a large prime and q - 1 is divisible by a large prime, that covers the two biggest error cases
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard a paper in 2015 has space complexity of cracking AES-128 down to 9 exabytes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exascale_computing
On 29 July 2015, Barack Obama signed an executive order creating a National Strategic Computing Initiative calling for the accelerated development of an exascale system and funding research into post-semiconductor computing.[32]
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run programs on the same system or platform that is performing AES.
the way they dance around the subject of how "side channels" work while glazing up known evil bad guys like djb and shamir is crazy. it's not about "running programs" on the same system, but those programs being able to trigger cryptographic operations in response to uncontrolled input
it's so crazy that AES and block ciphers more generally don't mix up ciphertext across blocks??????
i'm pretty sure that's correct????
ChaCha is the basis of the BLAKE hash function, a finalist in the NIST hash function competition, and its faster successors BLAKE2 and BLAKE3.
finally this all makes sense to me
learning about checksums. i don't like em
MD5 was designed by Ronald Rivest in 1991
does this guy literally do anything other than backdoors
There is a long list of cryptographic hash functions but many have been found to be vulnerable and should not be used.
i'm fucking amazed nobody has ever brought up the idea that checksums might be different for the purpose of integrity checking vs cryptographic signatures
@hipsterelectron My education background didn't really touch on cryptography (and would be decades out of date if I had), so maybe this is my own ignorance, but I'm not aware of any hash/checksum constructs that protect against forgery (pre-image resistance) without also having indifferentiability.
I have a hard time imagining what it would even mean that it's easy to look at `Hash(m)` and tell what `m` must have looked like, but still have it impractical to construct `m'` where `Hash(m') = Hash(m)`.
@heptapodEnthusiast i think you're probably right. i've been getting stuck trying to think about it
@heptapodEnthusiast one thing i did realize that retaining the entire hash computation tree is something we could do https://circumstances.run/@hipsterelectron/117141753102754283 and you wouldn't want that at all with a message signature
@heptapodEnthusiast i am using modular exponentiation as a commutative hash function for directory entries since those are unordered and idk if that's a thing i'm even allowed to do.
@hipsterelectron DH and RSA are the canonical examples of vulnerable to factoring or discrete logarithm breakthroughs and surprise, that's exactly what Shor's algorithm does.