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Emily Gladstone Cole boosted
Infoblox Threat Intel
@InfobloxThreatIntel@infosec.exchange  ·  activity timestamp last week

Don’t let MFA lull you into complacency. Advanced phishing kits can still slip through.

Before the Thanksgiving holiday, one of our customers alerted us to an Evilginx MITM phishing campaign targeting university students and SSO portals. At least 18 American institutions were targeted.

We tested several approaches for large-scale detection, including analyzing web server fingerprints and HTTP artifacts. However, this proved challenging because Evilginx operates as a proxy between the victim’s browser and the legitimate login page, making its behavior and content nearly indistinguishable from the real site. In the end, we mostly relied on DNS for confirmation and classification.

Here is a short blog about the campaign and actor, including involved domains and IPs.

https://blogs.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence/dns-uncovers-infrastructure-used-in-sso-attacks/

#InfobloxThreatIntel #dns #evilginx #threatintel #threatintelligence #infosec #cybersecurity #cybercrime #infoblox #phishing #mitm #aitm #sso #mfa #university #students #proxy #login

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Infoblox Threat Intel
@InfobloxThreatIntel@infosec.exchange  ·  activity timestamp last week

Don’t let MFA lull you into complacency. Advanced phishing kits can still slip through.

Before the Thanksgiving holiday, one of our customers alerted us to an Evilginx MITM phishing campaign targeting university students and SSO portals. At least 18 American institutions were targeted.

We tested several approaches for large-scale detection, including analyzing web server fingerprints and HTTP artifacts. However, this proved challenging because Evilginx operates as a proxy between the victim’s browser and the legitimate login page, making its behavior and content nearly indistinguishable from the real site. In the end, we mostly relied on DNS for confirmation and classification.

Here is a short blog about the campaign and actor, including involved domains and IPs.

https://blogs.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence/dns-uncovers-infrastructure-used-in-sso-attacks/

#InfobloxThreatIntel #dns #evilginx #threatintel #threatintelligence #infosec #cybersecurity #cybercrime #infoblox #phishing #mitm #aitm #sso #mfa #university #students #proxy #login

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nullagent
@nullagent@partyon.xyz  ·  activity timestamp 11 months ago

#13 No conversation privacy in default scalable configuration. Anyone can see your to/from fields and bc #1 it's great metadata.

Need to verify how bad #13 is, I think you can mitigate but most people use a public channel. The header I think its technically encrypted BUT with a known public key so everyone can see whose talking to whom. I think you can get encrypted headers on the public channel but docs aren't clear and probably limits your hops.

#meshtastic #cybersecurity

nullagent
@nullagent@partyon.xyz replied  ·  activity timestamp 11 months ago

Finally I suspect that IF meshtastic ever does fix their routing algo they will suffer from MITM exploits due to issues around #1, #6, #8, and #9.

Bc when you have MAC as the root of trust I can respond to your MAC and poison the routing table.

There might even by a solid security downgrade attack here too bc they have backwards compatibility for insecure DMs. So once I clone your MAC I can also downgrade security and ppl are trained to accept downgrades.

#meshtastic #cybersecurity #mitm

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