From somewhere at #39c3
From somewhere at #39c3
Some flexibility with Go’s sumdb
https://blog.yossarian.net/2025/12/29/Some-flexibility-with-Go-s-sumdb
Some flexibility with Go’s sumdb
https://blog.yossarian.net/2025/12/29/Some-flexibility-with-Go-s-sumdb
what are some of your favorite whitepapers & security models?
e.g., signal:
https://positive-intentions.com/docs/research/signal-protocol-security-audit/threat-model/
https://signal.org/docs/specifications/mlkembraid/
what are some of your favorite whitepapers & security models?
e.g., signal:
https://positive-intentions.com/docs/research/signal-protocol-security-audit/threat-model/
https://signal.org/docs/specifications/mlkembraid/
Faster Practical Modular Inversion
https://purplesyringa.moe/blog/faster-practical-modular-inversion/
#HackerNews #Faster #Modular #Inversion #Practical #Algorithms #Cryptography #Tech #News
Peter Gutmann - Why Quantum Cryptanalysis is Bollocks
Who's coming to #39C3?
I'm up for meeting up for a chat and talk about literally anything #cryptography #decentralization or #p2p related.
Who's coming to #39C3?
I'm up for meeting up for a chat and talk about literally anything #cryptography #decentralization or #p2p related.
#RedHat just shipped its first RPM signed with #PostQuantum #Cryptography, completing a major push across multiple teams to make this happen.
`ipmitool-1.8.19-10.el10_1` from https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2025:23156:
```
[root@rhel-10-1 ~]# rpmkeys -Kv ipmitool-1.8.19-10.el10_1.aarch64.rpm |& head -3
ipmitool-1.8.19-10.el10_1.aarch64.rpm:
Header V6 ML-DSA-87+Ed448/SHA512 Signature, key ID 05707a62: OK
Header V4 RSA/SHA256 Signature, key ID fd431d51: OK
```
#RedHat just shipped its first RPM signed with #PostQuantum #Cryptography, completing a major push across multiple teams to make this happen.
`ipmitool-1.8.19-10.el10_1` from https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2025:23156:
```
[root@rhel-10-1 ~]# rpmkeys -Kv ipmitool-1.8.19-10.el10_1.aarch64.rpm |& head -3
ipmitool-1.8.19-10.el10_1.aarch64.rpm:
Header V6 ML-DSA-87+Ed448/SHA512 Signature, key ID 05707a62: OK
Header V4 RSA/SHA256 Signature, key ID fd431d51: OK
```
I just found this cool video explaining the Diffie-Hellman cryptographic key exchange with the analogy of mixing colors! I was not aware of this neat explanation! Cute!
Post-Quantum Cryptography on CHERIoT via @fanf https://lobste.rs/s/azgmvv #cryptography
https://cheriot.org/pqc/2025/12/12/pqc-on-cheriot.html
Post-Quantum Cryptography on CHERIoT via @fanf https://lobste.rs/s/azgmvv #cryptography
https://cheriot.org/pqc/2025/12/12/pqc-on-cheriot.html
New Blog: #Keyserver Updates and Roadmap, December 2025
...
About half of the public #Hockeypuck keyservers have been upgraded to the 2.3 branch (as of 2025-12-08), including the pgpkeys.eu servers. A small number remain on 2.1 for compatibility reasons, but the remaining issues preventing upgrade of these 2.1 servers will be addressed in an upcoming 2.3.x release.
...
While HKPv2 and RFC9580 support are the current priorities, further improvements are planned for delivery in 2026 and 2027. These include:
* Allowing #OpenPGP key owners to explicitly restrict the distribution of third-party signatures over their User IDs, to prevent signature flooding.
* Out of band email proofs of User ID validity, to mitigate spam and impersonation.
* A fully-featured management API to better handle deletion and blocklisting of incorrect or spammy keys.
* Native rate limiting and tor exit node abuse detection.
* Detection (and potential removal) of keys with known vulnerabilities or weaknesses.
* Improvements to the dump and restore process to allow a running server to be backed up without a restart.
New Blog: #Keyserver Updates and Roadmap, December 2025
...
About half of the public #Hockeypuck keyservers have been upgraded to the 2.3 branch (as of 2025-12-08), including the pgpkeys.eu servers. A small number remain on 2.1 for compatibility reasons, but the remaining issues preventing upgrade of these 2.1 servers will be addressed in an upcoming 2.3.x release.
...
While HKPv2 and RFC9580 support are the current priorities, further improvements are planned for delivery in 2026 and 2027. These include:
* Allowing #OpenPGP key owners to explicitly restrict the distribution of third-party signatures over their User IDs, to prevent signature flooding.
* Out of band email proofs of User ID validity, to mitigate spam and impersonation.
* A fully-featured management API to better handle deletion and blocklisting of incorrect or spammy keys.
* Native rate limiting and tor exit node abuse detection.
* Detection (and potential removal) of keys with known vulnerabilities or weaknesses.
* Improvements to the dump and restore process to allow a running server to be backed up without a restart.